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This paper will be concerned with the semantic 
interpretation of sentences such as in (1): 
(1) a. Whatever Mary wears, she looks pretty. 
b. Whoever comes in we (will) remain seated. 
c. However rich Mary might be, John will not marry 
her. 
d. Wherever you go, you will always have to pay 
taxes. 
The sentences in (1) all consist of two parts: a 
main clause ("she looks pretty" in (la» and an "uncon-
ditional clause" headed by WH-ever preceding it. This 
order is in fact not essential to the construction and 
an unconditional clause can also follow the main clause 
as in the following examples. 
(2) a. Mary looks pretty, whatever she wears. 
b. We (will) remain seated, whoever comes in. 
c. John will not marry Mary, however rich she 
might be. 
d. You will always have to pay taxes, wherever you 
go. 
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The main feature of the interpretation of these 
sentences has to do with the conditional relationship 
between the meaning of an adverbial clause headed by 
"WH-ever" and the meaning of the main clause. In par-
ticular, such sentences are interpreted as claiming the 
truth of the proposition expressed by the main clause 
independently (or "unconditionally") of the choice of 
any particular value for the variable represented (or 
bound) by the WH-phrase in the adverbial clause. 
Following Zaefferer (1987) I will refer to such adver-
bial phrases as unconditional clauses. 
Let us first try to clarify what an unconditional 
interpretation is. Consider example (3). 
(3) Wherever John lives, he will always have to pay 
taxes. 
(3) has at least the two following readings. The 
first reading may be paraphrased as follows: "In the 
place in which John lives he will always have to pay 
taxes". Such an interpretation may be intended in a 
situation Where a certain place was mentioned in pre-
vious discourse, the name of which the speaker does not 
remember at the moment of utterance. Under a second 
interpretation a statement is made about a conditional 
relationship between John's living somewhere and John's 
having to pay taxes, namely, a statement is made that 
such a relationship does not exist, that is, John will 
have to pay taxes wherever he lives. The following 
examples may serve as a further illustration. 
(4) a. Whoever wins the election I will invite for 
dinner. 
b. Whoever wins the election, the situation will 
be bad. 
The sentence in (4a) talks about the specific, or 
unique, winner of the election whose identity is not 
known at the moment of utterance. That person will be 
invited for dinner. The interpretation of (4b) on the 
other hand is radically different. (4b) makes the 
claim that a certain relationship holds between two 
entities that are propositional in nature, namely, the 
proposition that the situation will be bad, on the one 
hand, and "Whoever wins the election" on the other. 
Obviously, we will have to clarify in what sense this 
second entity is propositional. However, it is not 
hard to see what the minimal difference between (4a) 
and (4b) is. Whereas in (4a) an NP free relative (FR) 
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is related by syntactic movement to a gap in the main 
clause, such a relationship does not exist in (4b). 
Thus, if the FR in (4a) was related to the same posi-
tion in the main clause with only the difference that 
that position was occupied by a pronoun instead of a 
gap, the interpretation indicated for (4a) would not be 
available and the only possible interpretation would be 
the unconditional one as demonstrated by (5). 
(5) Whoever wins the election, I will invite him for 
dinner. 
(5) says that the person who wins the election 
will be invited for dinner regardless of who it is. 
Thus, whereas the pronoun occupying the object position 
of "invite" in the main clause is anaphorically related 
to the subject position "of win the elections" in the 
unconditional clause, the FR in (4b) is related to that 
object position by movement, that is, it is an argument 
of the verb. If this observation is supposed to lead 
to any generalization, we would expect that the same 
fact would hold for unmoved FRs in argument positions. 
This is certainly true for the following example, to be 
compared with (5). 
(6) I will invite whoever wins the election for dinner. 
This seems to be true also for FR's figuring as 
subjects (7a) or objects of prepositions (7b). 
(7) a. Whoever wins the election will raise taxes. 
b. They will talk with whoever is willing to talk 
with them. 
Thus, it seems that for a constituent to be inter-
preted as an unconditional clause it must not be 
related to an argument position in the main clause, 
either by occupying such a position or by being moved 
from it. 
Let us summarize the two main observations pre-
sented above. Our first observation concerned a dis-
tinction between two types of interpretation available 
for phrases headed by WH-ever. The first, the "uncon-
ditional" interpretation, will be the main interest of 
this paper. The second is the regular interpretation 
available for any constituent type, either headed by 
WH-ever or not. Given this distinction, we then 
observed that the unconditional interpretation is not 
available for a "WH-ever phrase" which is syntactically 
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related to an argument position. It is possible that a 
syntactic account could be provided for this observa-
tion. Such an account could simply consist of indi-
cating that, given the nature of the unconditional 
interpretation, such an interpretation could only be 
assigned to sentential constituents. It would then 
follow that phrases which must be construed as NP's (or 
other category types) subcategorized for by a verb 
cannot qualify for this kind of interpretation. since 
this question is basically syntactic in nature no 
attempt will be made to resolve it here. Rather, the 
main interest of this paper will be the nature and 
derivation of the unconditional interpretation. 
2. The discourse function of unconditionals 
An important notion that, as I will try to show, 
is central to the analysis of unconditionals is the one 
of conversational background. This notion is related 
to What has been referred to in the literature as 
"common ground", "speaker presupposition" and possibly 
other terms. As suggested by Stalnaker (1978) and Heim 
(1982), the presuppositions of the speaker are the pro-
positions whose truth he takes for granted as part of 
the background of the conversation and which he assumes 
that his audience believes or assumes to be true as 
well. One may assume that in an ideal communication 
situation there is a certain set of presuppositions 
that are shared by all participants. This is the 
common ground of a context. Assuming a possible worlds 
framework, a set of speaker's presuppositions may be 
defined as a set of all and only possible worlds which 
are compatible with everything that the speaker presup-
poses. Such a set of possible worlds is referred to by 
Stalnaker (J.978) as the "context set." The effect of 
an assertion made in a conversation situation is to 
reduce the context set in a particular way. Assuming 
the willingness of the audience to accept the asser-
tion, a new context set is created by eliminating all 
the possible worlds that are incompatible with the pro-
position asserted. It is assumed by Stalnaker that a 
proposition asserted is always true in some but not all 
of the possible worlds in the context set. This fol-
lows if one assumes that a speaker does not felicitous-
ly assert something which is already presupposed (that 
is, true in all the worlds of the context set). ThUS, 
the effect of a felicitous assertion is always a reduc-
tion of the context set. 
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It will be seen later in this paper how the notion 
of conversational background can be integrated into a 
more general theory of conditional modality, but given 
this notion as presented so far, a simple conditional 
as in (8) may help to illustrate the interaction of 
unconditionals with the conversational background. 
(8) If I scratch this match, then it will light. 
Given normal circumstances, in particular, circum-
stances in which this match is dry and not wet, the 
conditional in (8) would be normally taken to be true. 
That is, given a certain set of implicit background 
assumptions and the antecedent clause "I scratch this 
match," the consequent "it will light" is claimed to 
follow. 
The conditional statement made in the following 
example is clearly different: 
(9) If I scratch this match and it is wet, then it 
will light. 
In (9) the assumption of normal circumstances in 
which matches are dry is explicitly denied. (9) cer-
tainly does not follow from (8). It makes a different 
statement. Consider now the following unconditional: 
(10) Whichever match I scratch, it will light. 
Assuming that by "whichever match" one means to 
include any kind of matches, including both wet and 
dry, then, among other claims, it makes also the one 
that the match will light even if it is wet. A back-
ground assumption as to normal circumstances in which 
matches are dry is not explicitly denied, but it is 
clear that such an assumption is not made. Rather, the 
proposition expressed by the main clause ("it [the 
match] will light") is asserted to be true regardless 
of what kind of match (wet or dry) is scratched. That 
is, as far as the background is concerned, no assump-
tion is made with respect to this particular detail. 
One may say that the background is free to vary over 
all possible values with respect to this parameter. 
The important observation that the interpretation 
of unconditional clauses is associated with this parti-
cular discourse mechanism of "opening the background" 
was first made by Zaefferer (1987). It is this obser-
vation that will serve as our point of departure. Our 
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task in this paper will be to demonstrate how it can be 
derived from a general theory of conditional modality. 
One may relate the above observations to the fact 
that unconditional sentences are easily paraphrasable 
as even-if conditionals, as in the following pair: 
(11) a. However tall John is, he will be a great 
basketball player. 
b. Even if he is short, John will be a great 
basketball player. 
Given a set of background assumptions which in-
cludes the one that in order to be a basketball player, 
being tall is normally a required condition, an uncon-
ditional such as (lla) can be paraphrased as in (lIb), 
since (lla) is understood as a rejection of such a 
background assumption. Clearly (lla) does not claim 
that if John was tall, he would be a great basketball 
player. Rather, what it claims is that whether or not 
he will be a great basketball player does not depend on 
how tall he is. 
Thus, assuming a certain pragmatic scale varying 
over the property of "being tall" and which goes from 
the value "very tall" all the way down to "short", then 
our average real world knowledge includes the assump-
tion that a certain value within this scale has to be 
assigned to a person in order for that person to be 
able to become a great basketball player. However, as 
soon as any assumptions with respect to this scale are 
rejected as irrelevant, it is immediately implied that 
one can go all the way down on this scale and the pro-
position expressed by the main clause ("John will be a 
great basketball player") will still be true. 
Given this view of the implicational relation 
between (lla) and (llbj and assuming the same kind of 
background knowledge, in particular an assumption such 
as "If a person is (very) small then he can never be a 
great basketball player", then a reversed implication 
such as in (12) is expected: 
(12) a. However tall John is, he will never be a great 
basketball player. 
b. Even if he is very tall, John will never be a 
great basketball player. 
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A detailed analysis of how the interpretation of 
unconditionals is derived will be attempted in the 
following sections. 
3. Unconditionals and conditionals 
31 
In trying to develop a semantic analysis of uncon-
ditionals, I will first indicate why and how such an 
analysis should differ from the analysis of regular 
conditionals. 
In presenting the data in Section 1 we noted the 
difference between FR's occupying an argument position 
inside the main clause and WH-constituents that func-
tion as unconditional clauses and are not syntactically 
related to any argument position. We observed the con-
trast between pairs such as the following: 
(13) a. Whoever violates the law will go to jail. 
b. Whoever violates the law, he will go to jail. 
Assuming the framework developed by Lewis (1975) 
and Heim (1982), among others, a logical representation 
of (l3a) would be a tripartite structure which looks 
roughly as follows: 
(14) ~
x violates the law x goes to jail 
In this representation, the "propositional func-
tion" derived from the FR serves as a restrictive 
clause while the "propositional function" derived from 
the matrix clause by extracting the FR from it serves 
as a nuclear scope. The subject-FR is understood as 
universally quantified, therefore the universal 
operator. The interpretation of logical forms such as 
this one is such that for the sentence to come out 
true, it must be the case that every value assignment 
which satisfies the restrictive clause also satisfies 
the nuclear scope. 
(13a) is identical in meaning to (15a) and (lSb). 
(15) a. Every person who violates the law will go to 
jaiL 
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b. If a person violates the law, he will go to jail. 
The logical form of (15a,b) is basically identical 
to (14) except for the maximally general additional 
condition that "x is a person", a condition which 
changes nothing with respect to the truth value of 
(15a,b). (16) would be the logical form that incorpo-
rates this additional condition. 
(16) s 
X 1.S a person x will go to jail 
x violates the law 
In both (14) and (16), the variable x is directly quan-
tified over. The logical formulae corresponding to 
(14,16) will be (17a) and (17b), respectively. 
(17) a. vx [violates the law(x)] [will go to jail (x)] 
b. Vx [person(x) & violates the law(x)] [will go 
to jail (x)] 
There is a subtle but still visible difference in 
meaning between (13b) (the unconditional) on the one 
hand, and (13a) and (15a,b) on the other, namely, in 
(13b) the sense of generality and exceptionlessness is 
stronger than it is in the other three forms. There 
are. however, examples in which the contrast between a 
conditional and an unconditional is much clearer. (The 
following pairs are from Zaefferer (1987». 
(18) a. If we pay him something. Max does his job. 
b. Whatever we pay him. Max does his job. 
(19) a. If she wears something. Amanda looks pretty. 
b. Whatever she wears. Amanda looks pretty. 
The (a) and the (b) members of the pairs above 
differ clearly in truth conditions. Whereas in the un-
conditionals (b) the proposition expressed by the main 
clause is claimed to be true. this is not the case in 
the (a) sentences. In these examples only a condi-
tio,lal relationship is claimed to hold between the main 
clause and its antecedent. Given our framework. the 
(a) examples will be assigned the usual logical form as 
indicated for previous examples (16). If the same 
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logical form is assigned to (~8b) and (~9b), the ques-
tion that arises immediately is how this difference in 
meaning can be accounted for. In the next pages I will 
try to provide an analysis of unconditionals which will 
be in conformity with the general analysis of condi-
tionals. In this analysis, unconditionals are limited 
to tripartite structures in which modals function as 
operators. The difference in meaning between condi-
tionals and unconditionals is derived, on this view, 
from the different way in which these logical forms are 
semantically interpreted. Such an analysis of uncondi-
tionals will be shown to follow from a general theory 
of modality. In particular, I will make use of the 
theory of conditional modality as developed by Kratzer 
(~979, ~987). I will therefore proceed first to a 
somewhat detailed presentation of Kratzer's theory of 
modality. 
4. A theory of conditional modality 
In the framework of possible worlds semantics, a 
proposition is defined as the set of possible worlds in 
which it is true. Given such a conception we may think 
about worlds in terms of the sets of propositions that 
are true in those worlds. We can further use these 
notions to give a model theoretic definition of what 
was referred to earlier as the conversational back-
ground. In these terms, a conversational background is just a function from possible worlds to sets of propo-
sitions. A further step along these lines consists of 
a distinction between different kinds of conversational 
backgrounds, accounting for the different meanings a 
modal (explicit or implicit) can have. For example, a 
modal like "must" can have (among others) a deontic, an 
epistemic, or a preferential meaning, as exemplified in 
(20-22). 
(20) Deontic: 
Soldiers must obey their orders (in view of 
what is legally prescribed) 
(2~) Epistemic: 
It must be hot on the surface of the sun (in 
view of what is known) 
(22) Preferential: 
We must have that hat (in view of what our 
preferences are) 
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Thus, a deontic conversational background consists of a 
certain set of propositions which define a certain 
moral code or legal system. In our terms, a deontic 
conversational background is a function H which assigns 
to each world a set of propositions defining a moral 
code or a legal system in that world. The same would 
apply for all other sorts of conversational background. 
Modals in this theory specify some logical rela-
tion between the proposition which is the meaning of 
the sentence which they modify and the set of proposi-
tions of which the background consists (the set of pro-
positions assigned to a world W by H). For example, 
~ specifies a relation of logical consequence. 
Thus, (20) is true in a world W if the proposition; 
"witnesses swear to tell the truth" follows logically 
from the set of propositions assigned to that world by 
the function H, interpreted deontically. The kind of 
conversational background involved in the interpreta-
tion of a sentence may be either implicitly or expli-
citly stated. Things get a little bit more complex 
when it comes to modal conditionals such as (23) (with 
a deontic conversational background). 
(23) If they are convicted, defendants must appear in 
court for sentencing. 
In this case, it is the union of the antecedent 
clause with the conversational background which is 
relevant. HoweVer, given that the relationship between 
the set resulting from this union and the proposition 
expressed by the main clause is that of logical conse-
quence, one must be careful about what the resulting 
union set is. In particular, if the resulting set is 
inconsistent, anything will follow from it. since this 
part of Kratzer's theory will turn out to be crucial 
for the analysis of unconditionals, I will illustrate 
it with the following example. Suppose that a deontic 
conversational background consists of the propositions 
in (24). 
(24) a. No one serves as captain of an oil tanker while 
drunk. 
b. Anyone serving as captain of an oil tanker 
while drunk loses his license. 
Given a conditional with the antecedent clause in 
(25) below, since (25) is inconsistent with (24a), any 
of the propositions in (26), if used as the consequent 
I 
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clause of (25), will follow from the union of (24) and 
(25) • 
(25) If John serves as captain of an oil tanker while 
drunk 
(26) a. he must lose his license 
b. he must not lose his license 
c. his license must be displayed at the national 
gallery 
d. he must be distinct from himself. 
Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To solve this 
problem, Kratzer proposes to adjust the interpretation 
of modal conditionals in the following way: Consider a 
scheme such as (27) representing a modal conditional 
with mY£t as its modal verb and with p and q being the 
propositions expressed by 51 and 52 respectively. 
(27) If 51 must 52 
Given a set of propositions A serving as the conversa-
tional backqround for (27), then must specifies that q 
should follow from every maximal consistent subset of 
the union of A and p, (A U (p» which includes p. 
Applied to our example, since (24a) and (25) are incon-
sistent, the only maximal consistent subset of the 
union of (24) and (25) will be the one including (24b) 
and (25) from which only (26a) follows logically, so 
that the conditional (28) will come out true. 
(28) If John drives down a one-way street the wrong 
way, he must lose his license. 
For a modal like "can", the analoqous requirement would 
be that q should be compatible with the set of all 
maximal consistent subsets of (A U (p» which include 
p, that is, it should follow from at least one of them. 
5tump (1985) applies this theory of modality to the 
semantic analysis of free adjuncts and develops some 
useful notation. 
For sentences in which a modal is unaccompanied by 
a conditional clause, so that the sentence is inter-
preted relative to a certain conversational background, 
a function C is assumed which takes as input a constant 
of type <s,«s,t>,t» which denotes the conversational 
background and qives as output the set of all its con-
sistent subsets, that is, a constant of type 
<s,«<s,t>,t>,t». C is thus a constant of type 
11
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«s,«s,t>,t»,<s,«<s,t>,t>,t»>. A modal is a func-
tion which takes as its two arguments the output of C 
«s,«<s,t>,t>,t») and a proposition <s,t> and yields 
a truth value. 
Thus, the modal mY§t is a function of type 
«s,«<s,t>,t>,t»,«s,t>,t» which gives the truth 
value 1 if for any proposition p and any set S of 
maximal consistent subsets s, p follows from S for 
every SES. A modal like ggn would be defined in an 
analogous way. 
For the case of conditional modals a function 0 is 
assumed which takes as its input a constant of type 
<s,«s,t>,t» denoting the conversational background 
and a proposition and yields the set of all consistent 
subsets of these two which include the given proposi-
tion. Thus, 0 is a constant of type 
«s,«s,t>,t»,«s,t>,<s,«<s,t>,t>,t»». Given these 
formalisms, the sentences in (29a) and (30a) will be 
translated as in (29b) and (30b) respectively (where cb 
stands for the conversational background) . 
(29) a. John must writ~ his paper. 
b. Must (C(cb» (John writes his paper) 
(30) a. If John has enough money, he can buy this car. 
b. Can (D(cb) (John has enough money» (He buys 
this car). 
5. The interpretation of unconditionals 
Coming finally to the analysis of unconditionals, 
the first thing to note is that unconditional clauses 
are incorporated into the overall interpretation just 
like if-clauses and free adjuncts. Thus, the truth 
functional import of the whole expression is evaluated 
with respect to the union of the set of background 
assumptions A and p, with the difference that p in this 
case is a universally quantified expression of the 
form: "Fx". Everything in the interpretation of uncon-
ditionals follows from this difference. One problema-
tic issue needs to be mentioned before we present the 
interpretation mechanism. On the analysis of uncondi-
tionals proposed here, their interpretation always 
involves the conversational background in the precise 
sense defined earlier. As "concrete objects" figuring 
in a semantic representation, conversational back-
grounds are arguments of operators, in particular, 
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modal operators. It is only in this way that they can 
fit into well formed semantic representations such as, 
for example, the ones given in (29b) and (30b). How-
ever, examples of unconditional sentences which have no 
overt modal operator are not too hard to find. (la), 
repeated here as (31), is one such example. 
(31) Whatever Mary wears, she looks pretty. 
It will therefore be necessary to assume that uncondi-
tional sentences such as (31) always involve an impli-
cit modal operator of some sort. As to the actual 
mechanism of interpretation, the semantic representa-
tion of the unconditional clause which serves as input 
to the function 0 is an expression of the form "Fx". 
For example, the unconditional clause in (32a) is 
translated as in (32b). 
(32) a. However tall John is, he will never be a great 
basketball player. 
b. [John is x tall). 
Given a conversational background, the question is 
now how a set of maximal consistent subsets including 
(32) is formed. The notion of consistency for a set of 
propositions A and a set of worlds w is defined in 
Kratzer (1979) as follows. 
(33) consistency: A set of propositions A is consis-
tent if and only if there is a world weW such that 
all propositions of A are true in W. otherwise, A 
is inconsistent. 
The above definition of consistency makes use of 
the notion of truth which is defined as follows: 
(34) Truth of a proposition: A proposition P is true 
in a world weW if and only if wePt otherwise, P is 
false in w. 
Obviously, the notion of consistency is only 
defined for propositions. To see how an expression 
such as in (32b) can be incorporated into the back-
ground, in order for a set of maximal consistent subset 
to be formed, some additional machinery will be needed. 
Assuming a domain of quantification 0 to be a con-
textually relevant set, then given a domain 0, we can 
define a set pI of propositions, as follows. 
13
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(35) pl= {pl3deD & [p= [I r/J 11d/X] } 
Assuming the definitions formulated above, no 
additional adjustments are needed with respect to the 
definition of the function 0 (not to be confused with 
the domain D). Thus, 0 operates on its arguments as 
represented in the following expression. 
(36) 0 (cb) ( p) 
Given that p in our case is the propositional 
function Fx (the translation of the unconditional 
clause), with x in the scope of a universal quantifier 
(signaled, or represented, in English by the morpheme 
"-ever"), the fUnction 0 applies for each one of p'eP', 
thus exhausting the contextually given domain D. 
The output of the operation in (36) (for p=Fx) is 
a set S of maximal consistent subsets seS such that 
(for some S') S=SIU{pl} for all plePI. 
To illustrate, consider example (32). p is the 
expression given in (32b). The set pI corresponding to 
p ([John is x tall]) is the set of propositions Pl,P2" 
••• Pn as follows. 
(37) pll: John is 4 feet tall 
P'2: John is 5 feet tall 
" II 
II 
P'n: John is n feet tall 
Thus, for any subset of the set of propositions 
given by the background to be consistent with [John is 
x tall], it must form a union set with each one of 
plt ••••• P·n such that each one of the resulting sets is 
consistent. Note now that if no assumption with 
respect to John's height is included in the conversa-
tional background, then no inconsistency arises. HoW-
ever, if there is in the conversational background an 
assumption with respect to John's height, for example: 
"John is 6 feet tall", then, given that it is impos-
sible for a person to be both x feet tall and y feet 
tall, (for x~y), at one and the same time, this assump-
tion will be inc.onsistent with all the propositions in 
P' except for one. Therefore, it does not figure in 
any of the sets seS except for one. It is this compu-
tational mechanism that gives rise to the special 
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effect of "opening the background", associated with 
unconditionals. 
39 
Moving one step further, a modal operator in an 
unconditional sentence defines a relationship between 
the output of the function D and the proposition Q 
expressed by the main clause (as in (29b), (30b». 
Given the set of maximal consistent subsets S which is 
the output of D, a modal like mY§t imposes the require-
ment that Q logically follow from all SES: As was said 
before, for all SES there is some p'EP' such that p'ES. 
Thus, all the sets SES are identical except for P'iEP' 
which figures as a member of each one of them. The 
propositions PEP' were defined as the set of proposi-
tions of the form Fal, Fa2 .••• Fan, with the set of con-
stants al , a2, ••.. an , denoting each and all of the 
individuals in a contextually relevant domain D. Thus, 
for Q to follow from seS its truth must not depend on 
the denotation of any of a l , a2, an. That is, as far as 
any particular value in the relevant domain D is con-
cerned, Q must be true. It is by this mechanism that 
the particular "unconditional" interpretation of these 
constructions is derived. 
6. Conversational backgrounds, modal operators and 
Logical Form 
In view of the analysis presented above, in parti-
cular the proposal that unconditional clauses function 
as arguments of operators, two issues need to be dis-
cussed. First, it might be expected that unconditional 
clauses would be interpretable equally well with all 
types of conversational backgrounds. This seems to be 
fairly unproblematic. The following examples illus-
trate unconditional clauses interacting with deontic, 
epistemic and preferential conversational backgrounds, 
respectively. 
(38) (Deontic) Whoever comes in, you must remain 
seated. 
(39) (Epistemic) Whatever you find in that drawer, it 
must belong to John. 
(40) (Preferential) However expensive it might be, I 
must have this book. 
Note that (38) is in fact ambiguous between (at 
least) a preferential and a deontic reading. Thus, a 
15
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deontic reading is relevant under circumstances in 
which a certain requirement or obligation to have the 
book is imposed on the speaker. We also find examples 
that show ambiguity between an epistemic and a deontic 
interpretation. 
(41) Whoever teaches in this department must have 
received a Ph.D. 
One also finds acceptable cases of unconditionals 
cooccurring with the existential modal "may". The fol-
lowing is such an example in which the modal operator 
is most naturally interpreted deontically. 
(42) Whoever comes in, you may remain seated. 
The discussion in the previous sections of this 
paper concentrated on the semantic interpretation of 
these constructions. It was assumed, however, that at 
the level of Logical Form unconditional clauses are 
represented in conformity with the general analysis of 
conditionals. Within such a framework unconditionals 
are represented as tripartite structures in which 
modals function as operators. Given this approach, we 
assume the basic logical form for an unconditional sen-
tence, with the modal "must", to be a configuration 
such as the following: 
(43) s 
Clause] 
In this configuration the propositional function Fx, 
representing the unconditional clause, figures as a re-
strictive clause. It is also assumed that in the basic 
case of (43) a universal operator is implicit in the 
interpretation of the modal "must". A universal 
operator is always involved in the interpretation of an 
unconditional. It is assumed that the morpheme "-ever" 
serves as a signal to this effect. Given this 
approach, we may attribute to (41) the following LF 
configuration. 
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(44) MU~ 
x teaches x has rece1ved 
in this dept. a Ph.D. 
In such a representation, the possibilities 
(necessity, in this case) are claimed in terms of the 
values of the restrictive clause (x teaches in this 
department). However, (41) may also have an interpre-
tation in which necessity is claimed in terms of each 
particular value (roughly: for all x, if x teaches in 
this department, then, given certain regulations, it 
must be the case that x has received a Ph.D.). A 
representation of such a reading could look like (45) 
in which one tripartite structure is embedded inside 
the other. 
(45) 




x has rece1ved 
a Ph.D. 
In this configuration a universal quantifier figures 
explicitly as an operator with the unconditional clause 
as its restrictor. The restrictive clause for the 
modal operator would consist of background assumptions 
specifying a certain set of regUlations (university 
regUlations in this case). Note now that, given the 
two possible configurations above, only (45) would be 
available for unconditionals with an existential modal 
(e.g. "may") since such a modal is incompatible with an 
implicit universal operator. Accordingly, one expects 
to find cases for which it is arguable that such a 
modal statement is incompatible with the restriction by 
the unconditional clause. The following (due, like 
much of the discussion in this section, to B.H. Partee) 
is possibly an example of such a case. 
(46) *Whatever you find in that drawer, it may belong 
to John. 
17
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7. Relevance and the conversational background 
Consider the following example: 
(47) Whenever you come to the restaurant, we will serve 
you. 
As was noted above, adverbial clauses headed by WH-ever 
are free to have both the unconditional and the regular 
adverbial interpretation. We will concentrate here on 
the unconditional reading, which seems to be the more 
salient. The interpretation of (47) implies an assump-
tion on the part of the speaker that there is normally 
some connection of relevance between the time of the 
day and whether or not a person will be served. That 
is, given normal background assumptions, food is served 
in the restaurant only during certain hours. As 
Kratzer (1979) notes, generalizing her own statement, a 
conversational background (in the precise sense assumed 
here), reflects in a certain way the assumptions which 
are relevant in the situation of utterance. ThUS, let 
us assume the following conversational background for 
(47) • 
(48) a. If a person comes to the restaurant during 
opening hOUrs, he will be served. 
b. A person comes to the restaurant during opening 
hours. 
Note that, given this background, the following modal 
conditional is true as predicted by our mechanism, 
since none of the propositions conflicts with its ante-
cedent clause. 
(49) If John comes to the restaurant during opening 
hours, he will be served. 
I would like to claim that (48) is also the conversa-
tional background relevant for (47). In this case, the 
proposition with respect to which consistency is 
checked is the following: 
(47' ) [you come at x] (for x ranging over times). 
Given our mechanism, (48b) is eliminated from all of 
the resulting maximal consistent subsets, but (48a), 
the general conditional statement, is not. This kind 
of effect is more striking in examples such as the 
following. 
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(50) However tall you are, you will make a good cook. 
(51) Whoever is elected president of the U.S.A, there 
is going to be a tornado in Florida. 
43 
(50) implies an assumption made by the speaker that how 
tall a person is is somehow relevant for the property 
of being a good cook. That is, there is an implicit 
conditional such as: "If a person is tall to such and 
such a degree, he is a good cook". (50) is interpreted 
in such a way that such a conditional still holds, 
except that it does not hold with respect to the person 
to which (50) is addressed. 
In (51) again, the (I assume) absurd assumption is 
made by the speaker that the identity of the president 
of the U.S.A. is somehow relevant to whether or not 
there will be a tornado in Florida. ThUS, (51) has in 
its background a proposition such as: "If a certain 
(type of) person is the president of the U.S.A., then 
there is a tornado in Florida." This conditional 
assumption remains in the background. But any assump-
tion with respect to any specific person x such as, "x 
is the president of the U.S.A" is eliminated. 
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Appendix : Unconditionals in Hebrew and the Syntax 
of Unconditionals 
Unconditional constructions in Hebrew are identi-
cal to their English counterparts in most relevant 
respects. However, it seems to me that the problem of 
their correct syntactic analysis can be better illus-
trated with the Hebrew data. Before going into this 
question it would be useful to mention one important 
fact. Note that in English the morpheme -ever is 
obligatory in an unconditional clause in order for it 
to fulfill this particular function. The absence of 
-ever results in ungrammaticality unless the clause 
from which it is missing can be construed with an argu-
ment position in the main clause. As for Hebrew, to 
signal the function of a constituent as an uncondi-
tional clause it makes use of the negation word 10 
(not). 
(1) mi Se *(10) yenatseax ba- bxirot ha-




will be bad 
"Whoever wins the election, the situation will be 
bad." 
As can be seen from the translation above, (1) contains 
no negation in its interpretation. This use of nega-
tion is traditionally referred to as "pleonastic 
negation". 
Coming back to our main issue, except for the 
obligatoriness of the negation 10, Hebrew unconditional 
clauses are identical in their surface appearance to 
FRs of all category types. The examples in (2-3) 
illustrate identical sequences figuring as uncondi-
tional clauses (a), as FRs moved out of an argument 
position in the main clause (b), or as occupying that 
position (c). As one may see, the difference of func-
tion of the same sequences is correlated with a dif-
ferent interpretation of the negation word 10. 
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(2) a. ma *(5e) Dan 10 yikne ze yihye 
what *fthatl Dan not will buy it will be 
yakar 
expensive 
"Whatever Dan buys, it will be expensive." 
b. ma *(5el Dan 10 yikne 
what *lthat) Dan not will buy 
Dina tikne 
Dina will buy 
"What (ever) Dan will not buy, Dina will buy." 
c. Dina 
Dina 
tikne ma *(5e) Dan 
will buy what *Cthat) Dan 
10 yikne 
not will buy 
"Dina will buy what Dan will not buy." 
(3) a. im mi *(5e) Dan 10 yedaber hu 
with whom *lthat) Dan not will talk he 
yargiS meSu'amam 
will feel bored 
45 
"Whoever Dan will talk to, he will feel bored." 
b. im mi *fSel Dan 10 yedaber Dina 
with whom *(that) Dan not will talk Dina 
tedaber 
will talk 
"Dina will talk with those who Dan will not 
talk to." 
c. Dina tedaber 
Dina will talk 
yedaber 
will talk 
im mi *(S9) Dan 10 
with whom *(thatl Dan not 
"Dina will talk with those who Dan will not 
talk to." 
As the examples above show, the occurrence of the com-
plementizer ~ is obligatory both for unconditional 
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clauses and for FRs. The occurrence of ~ is typical 




that you will buy 
~ is also obligatory in non-WH sentential complements 
(5) as opposed to interrogative complements (6). (OM = 
Object Marker). 
(5) Dan orner *(Se) hu kara et ha-sefer 
Dan says *(that) he read OM the-book 
(6) Dan Sa'al mi (*Se) kara et ha-sefer 
Dan asked who (*that) read OM the book 
Thus, with respect to the distribution of the com-
plementizer Se, unconditional clauses pattern like 
relative clauses and unlike WH-sentential complements. 
The distribution facts in (2-3) would also support a 
view of unconditional clauses as FRs (possibly headed 
by a nominal or a prepositional WH-element, respective-
ly). Viewing unconditional clauses as sentential would 
immediately raise the question as to the contrast with 
the sentential complements in (6). Whereas in (6) the 
cooccurrence of a WH word with Se (presumably the head 
of COMP) is strictly prohibited, exactly the opposite 
is true of unconditionals, as demonstrated in (2-3). 
However, viewing unconditional clauses as syntacticallY 
sentential would certainly be preferable given the 
facts about their interpretation and their formal 
analysis presented in this paper. It is certainly 
desirable to maintain a certain correlation between 
syntactic and semantic categories. However, it is hard 
to see how the restrictions on the distribution of ~ 
could be correlated with the semantic function of un-
conditionals. It is possible that these facts, in par-
ticular the contrast between unconditionals and senten-
tial WH-complements, would follow from some adequate 
theory of the structure of COMP and a particular 
analysis of the structure of COMP in Hebrew. One might 
wonder whether such an analysis is feasible, relating 
the syntactic and the semantic facts in a way which 
would be more than just a statement of the facts. 
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